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Abstract
This paper argues that metaphysically fundamental truths ought to be
defined within an algebraic language. In the first part of the paper, I pro-
vide examples of the algebraic structures used to define models of physical
ontology (namely, quantum mechanics and field theory); the mathemati-
cal universe (set-theory); modal logic; and the metaphysics of conscious-
ness. I outline, then, some explanatory desiderata concerning the relation
between fundamental and derivative truths. I argue that a relation of
apriori material implication, i.e. ’scrutability’, cannot satisfy the rele-
vant desiderata; and I propose in turn that – given the model-theoretic
uniformity between fundamental modal truths and the derivative truths
concerning mental representational states – a novel derivability relation
can be specified. The relation is unique in having a purely model-theoretic
characterization, and I examine the epistemic advantages accruing to the
relation’s model-theoretic profile.
1 Introduction
A contemporary project in metaphysics endeavors to target the fundamental
truths of the actual world; to account for the relations which obtain between
such truths; and to account for our knowledge thereof (cf. Sider, 2011; Chalmers
and Jackson, 2001; Chalmers, 2012; Paul, 2012; and Russell, ms).1 Sider ar-
gues that a proposition is fundamental iff it possesses a truth-condition in a
’metaphysical semantics’. A metaphysical semantics is stated in perfectly nat-
ural, because metaphysically joint-carving, terms for the sub-propositional en-
tities which comprise the target proposition. The absolute joint-carving terms
1The approach might be interpreted as a metaphysical extension of the project of formal
analysis in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, whose proponents familiarly
included Frege (1884; 1885); Moore (1899); Russell (1905); Wittgenstein (1921); Carnap
(1928); and Stebbing (1932-1933). For further discussion, see the essays in Beaney (2007).
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are purported to be fundamental because they are structural, and they are
taken to include logical vocabulary (including quantifiers), metaphysical predi-
cates such as the mereological parthood relation, and physical predicates. The
fundamental-structural truths are purported to be ascertainable via abductive
criteria on theory choice. Chalmers argues that the fundamental truths concern
phenomenal consciousness, physics, and indexical notions. From the foregoing
truths, all other types of truths are argued to be ’scrutable’; i.e., apriori derivable
via material implication relations [i.e., (φ→ ψ) iff (¬φ ∨ ψ)]. Epistemic truths
are argued to track metaphysical truths, where the relation is codified by the
epistemic interpretation of multi-dimensional intensional semantics. A formula
is epistemically possible (negatively conceivable) iff nothing rules it out apriori
(⋄ ⇐⇒ ¬¬). A formula is apriori iff it it is inconceivable for it to be false (
⇐⇒ ¬⋄¬). A formula can receive its semantic values relative to two param-
eters, a context and an index. The context ranges over epistemic possibilities
and the index ranges over metaphysical possibilities. The value of the formula
relative to the context determines the value of the formula relative to the index.
Thus – as long as the terms comprising the formula are ’super-rigid’, and thus
map to the same extension throughout epistemic and metaphysical modal space
– conceivability and apriori scrutability can be a guide to metaphysical possibil-
ity. Paul argues that the fundamental constituents of reality are properties and
relations, and that the fundamental ’world-building’ relation is the mereological
composition relation (op. cit.: 240-242). Russell argues that the metaphysical
semantics appealed to in Sider’s account of fundamental-structural truth ought
to be regimented using the language of category theory.2
2Cf. Author (ms), for an account of how – via a category-theoretic semantics inspired
by Russell’s (op. cit.) and Pettigrew’s (ms) presentations – mental images, as represented
by typed arrows, can be concatenated into propositional form. The category-theoretic se-
mantics can thereby account both for the structure of phenomenal representation and for the
relationship between mental imagery and propositional imagination.
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In this paper, I endeavor to give content to the notion of a metaphysi-
cal semantics, and I argue that the metaphysical semantics for fundamental
truths ought to be regimented in an algebraic language. Algebraic spaces are
availed of in order to countenance the structure of space-time in physics; models
of set-theoretic languages; the metaphysics of phenomenal properties; and the
model-theory of modality. By contrast to Russell’s proposal that structural-
fundamental truths ought to be regimented within category theory, the identity
of the elements comprising algebraic structures is a crucial aspect of the theories
for which they provide a model; the elements are flexible enough to elide the
distinction between formulas and terms; and they are thereby flexible enough
to elide operators on the formulas with functions on the terms. By contrast
to Chalmers’ proposal that physical truths, phenomenal truths, and indexical
truths are distinct sets of truths comprising a class of base truths, the present
proposal targets a more fundamental level of reality, by targeting the funda-
mental language common to each set of truths in the base. By contrast, finally,
to Paul’s proposal that the fundamental world-building relation is mereological
parthood, the proposal that the language of the fundamental class of base truths
is algebraic is corroborated by naturalistic considerations: In mathematics and
physics, models of physical theories and set-theory are actually algebraic in form
(cf. Halvorson, 2006; Ruetsche, 2011; Jech, 2002; and Bell, 2005).
In Section 2, I provide examples of the algebraic structures used to define
models of physical ontology (namely, quantum mechanics and field theory); the
mathematical universe (set-theory); modal logic; and the property theory for
the metaphysics of consciousness. In Section 3, I examine the status of the
derivation of non-fundamental truths from the algebraic base truths. I provide
reasons adducing against the contention that truths unique to the higher-level
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sciences such as neuroscience, economics, and sociology are scrutable from the
class of fundamental truths. I argue, however, that some truths are yet deriv-
able from the base, where the derivation relation is novel in virtue of being
purely model-theoretic. Because possible worlds model theory is availed of in
order to characterize both the structure of unconscious perceptual represen-
tational states and the speech acts and informational background in natural
language semantics, truths about perceptual representation and the values of
linguistic operators are model-theoretically derivable from fundamental modal
truths. Section 4 provides concluding remarks.
2 Algebraic Metaphysical Semantics for Funda-
mental Truths
In this section, I define the elementary properties of Boolean algebras, and
examine four extensions of Boolean algebras to the models of set theory, meta-
physical property theory, quantum mechanical kinematics and field theory, and
to modal logic.3
2.1 Boolean Algebra
A lattice is a non-empty, partially ordered set. Each two element subset has a
supremum or join (x ∨ y) and an infimum or meet (x ∧ y). The top element of
a bounded lattice is denoted 1, and its bottom element is denoted 0. A lattice is
complete if every subset has an infimum and a supremum (Bell, op. cit.: 2). A
Heyting algebra is a bounded lattice such that for all element pairs, x,y, x → y
iff there is a z such that z ≤ x → y iff z ∧ x ≤ y (3). Pseudocomplementation is
3The material here outlined follows the presentation in Jech (op. cit.) and Bell (op. cit.).
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an operation mapping each x in the algebra to an element, x’ = x→ 0 (Bell, op.
cit.). A Boolean algebra is a Heyting algebra such that pseudocomplements are
complements (x ∨ x’ = 1). The algebra has operators, +, •, and –, which satisfy
the properties of commutativity (u + v = v + u), associativity [u + (v + w) =
(u + v) + w], distributivity [u • (v + w) = u • v + u • w], absorption [u • (u +
v) = u], and complementation (u + –u = 1) (Jech, 78). A Lindenbaum algebra
is a Boolean algebra satisfying the following operations: With [x] denoting an
equivalence class and x an element variable, [φ] + [ψ] = [φ ∨ ψ], [φ] • [ψ] = [φ
∧ ψ], –[φ] = [¬φ], 0 = [φ ∧ ¬φ], and 1 = [φ ∨ ¬φ] (Jech, 79).
2.2 Property Theory and Set Theory
Two crucial generalizations of Boolean algebras have been to metaphysics and
to mathematics. As a model of metaphysical property theory, the elements of
Boolean algebra can be interpreted as phenomenal terms or concepts, the ex-
tensions of which are phenomenal properties. With regard to the interaction
between Boolean models and foundational mathematical languages, the Stone
Representation theorem states, in particular, that every Boolean algebra is iso-
morphic to an algebra of sets.4 Boolean-valued models of set-theory are crucial,
furthermore, to the notion of set-forcing extensions, which have familiarly been
availed of in order to prove the independence of the generalized continuum hy-
pothesis – 2ℵα = ℵα+1 – from the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (cf.
Cohen, 1963, 1964; Kanamori, 2008; and Jech, op. cit.: ch. 14).
4For further discussion, see Stone (1936).
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2.3 Quantum Mechanics and Quantum Field Theory
Boolean algebras also play an ineliminable role in contemporary physics. For
example, in the kinematics of quantum mechanics, a separable Hilbert space is
a space of countable complex-valued vectors representing physical magnitudes
(A,B, . . . ). The inner product of a Hilbert space is a linear functional on vectors
which specifies their expectation values. Density operators, f , on Hilbert space
map real-valued vectors to complex numbers. The operators are self-adjoint,
such that for all one-object categories with a homomorphism, a, from a target
category to its underlying set, there is a unique homomorphism, b, such that a
is isomorphic to b (cf. Awodey (2006 10, 180-181)); linear [f(A + B) = f(A)
+ f(B)]; non-negative [f(A) ≥ 0]; normed [f(T) = 1]; and countably additive
[if A and B are orthogonal, then f(A ∪ B) = f(A) + f(B)] (cf. Ruetsche, op.
cit.: 21-23).
In quantum field theory, a unital algebra is closed under the commutative
and associative operator, +; scalar multiplication by complex numbers, s.t. for
all vectors A,B, and complex numbers cn: c1(A + B) = c1A + c1B; (c1 + c2)A
= c1A + c2A; c1(c2A) = (c1c2)A; (c1A)B - A(c1B) = c1(AB); and satisfies
multiplicative identity, i.e., for an element I, AI = IA = A (op. cit.: 74). A
norm on an algebraic model is a function assigning a non-negative real number
to each element of the algebra (op. cit.: 75-76). A sequence vn of elements is a
’norm-wise Cauchy sequence’ iff for all elements > 0, there is a natural number
Ne s.t. ||vi - vj|| < e, for all i,j > Ne (76). The model is complete with respect
to a norm iff the limit of every norm-wise Cauchy sequence of elements is itself
an element (op. cit.). A C*-algebra is defined as an algebra over the complex
numbers, complete with respect to a norm, and s.t. ||A x A|| = ||A||2 and ||AB||
≤ ||A||||B|| (76-77). A von Neumann algebra for quantum fields interprets the
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elements in a C* algebra as Hilbert space operators whose convergence norm is
a topology (op. cit.: sec. 4.5; see also Halvorson, op. cit: 1.1-1.11).
2.4 Modal Algebra
Finally, in the topological semantics for modal logic, a frame is comprised of a
set of points in topological space, a domain of propositions, and an accessibility
relation:
F = 〈X, D, R〉;
X = (Xx)x∈X ; and
R = (Rxy)x,y∈X iff Rx ⊆ Dx x Dx, s.t. if Rxy, then ∃o⊆X, with x∈o s.t.
∀y∈o(Rxy),
where points accessible from a privileged node in the space are said to be
open.5
A model defined over the frame is a tuple, M = 〈F,V〉, with V a valuation
function, such that:
∀x,y∈X[x∈Vx(P) ∧ Rxy → y∈Vx(P)].
Necessity is interpreted as an interiority operator on the space:
M,x  φ iff ∃o⊆X, with x∈o, such that ∀y∈o M,y  φ.
In modal algebra, the topological Boolean algebra, A, is formed by taking
the powerset of the topological space, X, defined above; i.e., A = P(X). The
domain of A is comprised of formula-terms – eliding propositions with names
– assigned to elements of P(X). The top element of the algebra is denoted ’1’
and the bottom element is denoted ’0’. We interpret modal operators, f(x), –
i.e., intensional functions in the algebra – as both concerning topological interi-
ority, as well as reflecting metaphysical possibilities. A modal-valued algebraic
5The material here follows the presentation in Lando (2015). See McKinsey and Tarski
(1944) and Henkin et al. (1971), for further details.
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structure has the form, F = 〈A, DP (X), ρ〉, where ρ is a mapping from points
in the topological space to elements or regions of the algebraic structure; i.e., ρ
: DP (X) x DP (X) → A. A model over the modal topological Boolean algebraic
structure has the form M = 〈F, V〉, where V(a) ≤ ρ(a) and V(a,b) ∧ ρ(a, b) ≤
V(b). For all xx/a,φ,y∈A:
f(1 = 1);
f(x ≤ x);
f(x ∧ y) = f(x) ∧ f(y);
V(a, a) > 0;
V(a, a) = 1;
V(a, b) = V(b, a);
V(a, b) ∧ V(b, c) ≤ V(a, c);
V(a = a) = ρ(a, a);
V(a, b) ≤ f[V(a, b)];
V(¬φ) = ρ(¬φ) – f(φ);
V(⋄φ) = ρφ – f[– V(φ)];
V(φ) = f[V(φ)].
3 Model-Theoretic Derivability
In this section, I examine, finally, the nature of the relevant notion that all truths
can be derivable from a base class of fundamental truths. I proffer a particular
and a general issue for the approach to derivative and fundamental truths which
explains the derivation relation via the notion of scrutability, i.e., the apriori
material conditional (cf. Chalmers, op. cit.). The particular issue concerns
whether mathematical truths ought to be fundamental, or whether they must
be scrutable from physical truths. The general issue concerns the details with
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regard to whether the truths comprising theories in the higher-level sciences are
scrutable from the low-level, fundamental truths comprising the base. I argue
that – while the disunity of the sciences remains a live issue – algebraic meta-
physical semantics is novel in being able to explain the derivation of the truths
about mental representational states from the fundamental truths defined in the
algebraic language. The relevant notion of derivability need neither be apriori;
take the form of the material conditional; nor be defined as computability (i.e.,
the equivalence class comprised of partial recursive and lambda-definable func-
tions, as well as the transition functions of finite, discrete-state automata such as
Turing machines). Rather, the derivation relation is purely model-theoretic: Be-
cause the model-theory of modal logic is defined in algebraic languages, there is
prima facie justification to believe that modal truths are fundamental. Because
possible worlds model theory is availed of in order to countenance the structure
of the truths about mental representational states – such as unconscious per-
ceptual representations, and speech acts in natural language semantics – truths
about mental representation are thereby derivable from the fundamental modal
truths.
3.1 The Fundamentality of Mathematical Truth
There are at least two considerations adducing in favor of the fundamentality
of mathematical truths, such that mathematical truths need not be derivable
from truths about fundamental physics. The first consideration concerns the
disparity between the nature of truth in the foundations of mathematics – e.g.,
in non-constructive languages such as classical set-theory and constructive lan-
guages such as homotopy type theory – and the mathematical vocabulary which
is prevalent in physical theories. One major dispute in the setting of set-theory
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concerns the status of mathematical truth, given the undecidability of propo-
sitions such as the continuum hypothesis. A multiverse conception of mathe-
matical truth is in one sense relativist, by arguing that it is innocuous for the
truth-value of the continuum hypothesis to vary between distinct extensions of
ground models of ZF (cf. Hamkins, 2012). By contrast, a proponent of a cumu-
lative hierarchical conception of the universe of sets will endeavor to augment
the theory with large cardinal axioms, such as the existence of a proper class
of Woodin cardinals, which will hold invariantly in all set-forcing extensions of
the multiverse, and thus provide the foundations for a monadic conception of
mathematical truth (cf. Woodin, 2010).6 The status of mathematical truth
might thus be unique, because the content of physical truths – such as a Lan-
grangian equation, which codifies the difference between the total kinetic energy
of a system and the total potential energy of the system – is orthogonal to the
content of the relevant large cardinal axioms and the truth-value of undecidable
mathematical propositions.
The second consideration adducing against the derivation of mathematical
truths from physical truths is more familiar, and targets the status of mathe-
matical ontology. While arguments for platonism can appeal to the indispens-
ability of reference to mathematical objects in physical theories,7 the existence
of necessarily non-concrete objects such as numbers, functions, and sets still
6Large cardinal axioms can then be defined as follows.
∃xΦ is a large cardinal axiom, because:
(i) Φx is a Σ2-formula;
(ii) if κ is a cardinal, such that V |= Φ(κ), then κ is strongly inaccessible; and
(iii) for all generic partial orders P∈Vκ, VP |= Φ(κ); INS is a non-stationary ideal; A
G
is the canonical representation of reals in L(R), i.e. the interpretation of A in M[G]; and
L(R)Pmax |= 〈H(ω2), ∈, INS , A
G〉 |= ’φ’. P is a homogeneous partial order in L(R), such that
the generic extension of L(R)P inherits the generic invariance, i.e., the absoluteness, of L(R).
Thus, L(R)Pmax is (i) effectively complete, i.e. invariant under set-forcing extensions; and
(ii) maximal, i.e. satisfies all Π2-sentences and is thus consistent by set-forcing over ground
models (Woodin, ms: 28).
7See, e.g., Putnam (1971) and Colyvan (2001).
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cannot be reduced to the truths about the entities postulated in fundamental
physics. The argument is then conditional: If mathematical platonism is true,
then truths about abstract entities cannot be derivable from truths about the
concrete entities postulated in physics. There is thus prima facie support for
the contention that mathematical truths are dissociable from physical truths;
and the constitutive role of algebraic models in the foundations of mathematics
adduces, further, in favor of the thesis that mathematical truths are metaphys-
ically fundamental.
3.2 Explanatory Limits of Scrutability
According to the scrutability conception of alethic derivability, the derivation
relation is an apriori material conditional. Chalmers (op. cit.: 305) argues that
theoretical truths in the higher-level sciences are scrutable from the theoretical
truths concerning the fundamental lower-level sciences, in particular, physics.
The scrutability relation is supposed to provide a ’transparent bottom-up ex-
planation’, where the explanations leave ’no residual mystery about what the
higher-level facts are or about how the lower-level facts give rise to them’ (op.
cit.). Scrutability is further argued to be at least a necessary condition on the
reductive explanation between higher-level and lower-level truths (op. cit., 307).
Chalmers argues that one means by which scrutability can provide the epis-
temically transparent explanations alluded to in the foregoing is by targeting a
mechanistic analysis of explanation (op. cit.). Thus, e.g., truths about neuro-
science will be apriori derivable from truths about physics, by way of a three-
step process: First, the ’higher-level explananda are expressed using functional
concepts’; second, ’one tells a story about how low-level mechanisms play the
relevant [functional] roles’; and third, one matches the roles in the lower-level
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mechanistic story with the higher-level functional roles (op. cit.).
Following Chirimuuta (2014), one can distinguish between three types of
functional analysis pertinent to the nature of explanation. Let an ’A-minimal
model’ satisfy what has been referred to as a ’model-to-mechanism-mapping’
requirement, according to which ’a model of a target phenomenon explains that
phenomenon to the extent that (a) the variables in the model correspond to
identifiable components, activities, and organizational features of the target
mechanism that produces, maintains, and underlies the phenomenon, and (b)
the (perhaps mathematical) tendencies posited among these (perhaps mathe-
matical) variables in the model correspond to causal relations among the com-
ponents of the target mechanism’ (Kaplan, 2011: 347; Kaplan and Craver, 2011:
611). Let a ’B-minimal model’ provide a less coarse-grained level of explanation,
where ’the details of the system (those details that would feature in a complete
causal-mechanical explanation of the system’s behavior) are largely irrelevant
for describing the behavior of interest . . . [and] Many different systems with
completely different ’micro’ details will exhibit identical behavior’ (Batterman,
2002: 13). Finally, let a Chirimuuta-, or ’I-minimal model’ target a level of
explanation which is ’made precise and quantitative by reference to efficient
coding principles’ (op cit: 143). While A-minimal models target mechanistic
explanations, and B-minimal models target non-causal and non-mechanistic,
generalizable explanations, the efficient coding explanations in I-minimal mod-
els are purported to be more elucidatory, by privileging abstract, computational
properties. The coding principles are claimed to be more explanatory in virtue
of the conditions on their selection; in particular, their abductive utility (143-
144).
It is unclear whether any of the foregoing functional analyses can satisfy
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the desiderata proffered by Chalmers, concerning the matching of functional
roles across the higher- and lower-level sciences. One issue is thus that, even on
an I-minimal construal of those functional roles according to which the latter
are selected on the basis of their abductive utility, it is unclear why an abduc-
tively preferred function in physics – such as the complex-valued wave function
in configuration spacetime – ought to be either correlated to, or provide an
epistemically transparent explanation of, an abductively preferred function in
neuroscience – e.g., the ’Normalization Model’ as a canonical computation, ac-
cording to which ’responses of neurons are divided by a common factor that
typically includes the summed activity of a pool of neurons’ (Carandini and
Heeger, 2011: 51; Reynolds and Heeger, 2009).8
Even within a particular higher-level science such as cognitive neuroscience,
the neural localization of psychofunctional properties is currently taken to be
widely distributed. Thus, e.g., the retrieval of information from working memory
stores is correlated to various brain areas, such as increased blood-oxygenation
levels both in V4 and in the dorsal-lateral prefrontal cortex. It is also an open
question whether the types of attentional mechanisms can be localized to the
frontal eye fields; V4; dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex; lateral intraparietal cor-
tex; or to a unique firing-rate of neural populations. There might thus not be
a unique correlation between psychofunctional properties and neurofunctional
properties. The absence of a unique correlation might undermine the likeli-
hood that the scrutability of higher-level truths from lower-level truths can be
accounted for by the proposed matching of functions.
8The Normalization formula is E¯i(n) =
Ei(n)
σ2+
∑
i
Ei(n)
.σ is a constant that is relevant to
the strength of sensory inputs as encoded by Ei(n).
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3.3 Model-theoretic Derivability
Despite the explanatory disunity of the higher- and lower-level sciences, the
algebraic conception of metaphysical semantics is able to provide a novel ac-
count of the derivability of some non-fundamental truths from the base class of
fundamental truths. The non-fundamental truths at issue are truths about un-
conscious mental representational states and the semantic values of linguistic op-
erators. Possible worlds model theory is availed of in Bayesian vision science and
the program of natural language semantics in linguistics, in order to regiment
the structural content of unconscious perceptual representational states and the
speech acts of interlocutors given their shared informational background. In
the remainder of this section, I will argue that – because the non-fundamental,
representational truths are characterized by modal models, and because the
algebraic model-theory of modal logic provides prima facie support for the con-
tention that modal truths are fundamental – the model-theoretic uniformity of
the target derivative and fundamental truths can explain in virtue of what the
former are derivable from the latter.
Bayesian vision science endeavors to answer the problem of under-determination,
and thus to account for how retinal lightwave spectra can be transformed into
perceptual states with accuracy-conditions. The current model for the con-
stitutive conditions on perceptual representation takes perceptual accuracy-
conditions to be possible worlds: Given the possibility that light might be
emanating from above or might be emanating from below, the visual system
computes the likelihood that one of the possibilities is actual (cf. Mamassian
et al, 2002; Burge, 2010; Rescorla, 2013). The calculation of which possibility
is actual – referred to as the perceptual constancy – places a condition on the
accuracy of the attribution of properties, such as boundedness and volume, to
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distal physical particulars.
In the program of natural language semantics in empirical linguistics, modal-
ity plays a crucial role, as well, in the characterization of the conversational
background presupposed by a community of speakers (cf. Kratzer, 1977, 2012;
Stalnaker, 1978). The update effects of various speech acts on the common
ground have also been modeled as types of modal operators, whose semantic
values are definable relative to an array of intensional parameters. Whereas
the speech act of assertion is argued to provide a truth-conditional effect on
the shared background of possibilities, the update effects of utterances involv-
ing epistemic and deontic modal vocabulary is taken, by contrast, not to be
straightforwardly truth-conditional (cf. Yalcin, 2012; Moss, 2015). In the lat-
ter case, one might distinguish between the semantic values of subjective and
objective deontic speech acts, such that – when it is claimed to be objectively
obligatory that φ – the deontic modal can be defined relative to a context rang-
ing over concrete situations (including an agent, location, and time), and – when
it is claimed to be subjectively obligatory that φ – the deontic modal can be
defined relative to a context as above and an index ranging over the agent’s
states of information.
The philosophical significance of the role of modality in characterizing both
perceptual and lingustic mental representations is that the higher-level truths
about mental intentional states can be immediately derivable from the funda-
mental modal truths. The primary virtue of the derivation relation is that
it is purely model-theoretic, rather than taking the more coarse-grained form
of a material entailment relation stratifying formulas between the higher- and
lower-level sciences.
A further virtue of model-theoretic derivability is that it is neutral with
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regard to the epistemic profile of the derivation. The derivation is amenable (i)
to being justified apriori – where apriority can be defined either extensionally as
justification in the absence of experience, or intensionally as the inconceivability
of the falsity of the relation’s satisfaction; (ii) to being confirmed on the basis of
evidence; (iii) and – consistently with the types of truth at issue – to being known
by cognitive exercises which take the form of counterfactual presuppositions,
where the latter are themselves translatable into modal operators (cf. Stalnaker,
1968, 2011; and Williamson, 2007: 156-158).
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I have endeavored to argue that – because algebraic structures
are availed of in theories of the structure of space-time in physics, set-theoretic
languages, and in the model-theory of modal logic – the metaphysical seman-
tics for fundamental truths ought to be defined in an algebraic language. The
limits of competing proposals concerning which truths ought to be fundamental
were then examined. I outlined, then, some explanatory desiderata concerning
the nature of the relation between fundamental and derivative truths, and I
argued that a relation of apriori material implication, i.e. scrutability, could
not satisfy the relevant desiderata. Finally, I proposed in turn that – given the
model-theoretic uniformity between fundamental modal truths and the deriva-
tive truths concerning mental representational states – at least one derivability
relation can be specified. The nature of the derivability relation was shown to
possess a novel model-theoretic profile, and the epistemic advantages accruing
to the purely model-theoretic characterization were then examined.
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